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Tax-Exempt Mortgage Revenue Bonds: Another
Case of "Opiate Economics"?
Controversy surrounds the use of mortgage revenue bonds.' Critics say "the government is trying to cure the harmful results of its
overborrowing by engaging in more of the same, a classic case of
opiate economics."' Proponents, on the other hand, view the bonds
as a beneficial device in urban development.8 Mortgage bonds have
been used to finance multi-family rental housing for a number of
years; but bonds for financing single-family homes have only recently appeared on the market. These issues have experienced an
explosive growth.
Today's double-digit inflation set the stage for the rapid growth
in mortgage revenue bonds. The federal government's tight monetary policy seriously affected the supply of mortgage capital at a

1. See Smith, Tax-Free Housing Bonds Cost More Than They Are Worth, Fortune, July
2, 1979, at 86; Seib, New Municipal Bonds Provide Home Buyers With Cut-Rate Loans,
Wall St. J., Feb. 26, 1979, at 1, col. 1; Jim Lopp's Innovative Bonds, Business Week, Nov.
13, 1978, at 108.
2. See, e.g., Remarks of Rep. Andrew Jacobs, Jr. of Indiana (printed in H.R. Rep. No.
96-678, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 93 (1979)). "With the tax-free mortgage bond program the
government is trying to cure the harmful results of its overborrowing by engaging in more of
the same, a classic case of opiate economics."
3. See, e.g., Remarks of Rep. Frank Annunzio of Illinois (printed in Seib, New Municipal Bonds Provide Home Buyers with Cut-Rate Loans, Wall St. J., Feb. 26, 1979, at 1, col.
1). "Although only a small step toward arresting the decline of America's cities, the Chicago
plan is an important one. It shows that, by shedding antagonism and working together, local
businesses and government can bring our cities back to life-without the aid or supervision
of the Washington bureaucracy."
4. Tax Treatment of Mortgage Subsidy Bonds: Hearings on H.R. 3712 Before the Committee on Ways & Means, 96th Cong., 1st Ses. 2 (1979) (statement of Chairman Al Ullman). (Hereinafter referred to as Hearings on H.R. 3712).
The issuance of tax-exempt housing bonds has grown tremendously during the
past year. In 1978 State and local governments issued $3.3 billion of mortgage
subsidy and industrial development bonds for owner-occupied residential units.
This represented 7.1 percent of the total tax-exempt long-term financing for all
purposes by State and local governments.
In the first four months of 1979 State and local governments already have issued more housing bonds than were issued during the entire previous year, 1978.
This enormous volume of housing bonds represents 27 percent of the total State
and local government issues during this 4-month period. In addition, as of April
25, 1979, their appears to be $3 to $5 billion of proposed housing bonds at various
stages of development.
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time when the demand for housing was strong. The rising interest
rates on conventional mortgages priced many families out of the
new home market. Investment banking firms saw mortgage bond
financing as a solution to the lack of mortgage capital.
The popularity of mortgage revenue bonds stems from several
factors. Mortgage revenue bonds are tax-exempt; the tax benefits
attracted many investors. The methods used in financing housing
issues place few risks on the issuers. State and local governments
thus were willing to float bonds in epidemic proportions. Moreover,
marketing the bonds allowed local governments to raise additional
capital without burdening local taxpayers.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the controversy surrounding the use of mortgage revenue bonds. The discussion will
begin with the mechanics of mortgage bond financing. It will then
explain how federal and state law enables state and local governments to finance single-family homes. The rapid growth of mortgage revenue bonds will be surveyed along with a comparison of
their relative benefits and failings. Finally, policy justifications will
be advanced in favor of restricting the unlimited use of mortgage
revenue bonds.
THE MECHANICS OF MORTGAGE REVENUE BOND FINANCING

In the typical mortgage revenue bond program, a state housing
finance agency (HFA) or local governmental unit issues the bonds
for the "public purpose '5 of providing low-interest loans to eligible
buyers.6 Because the federal government does not tax the interest
on such bonds, the state HFA or local governmental unit is able to
sell the bonds at a lower interest rate. This in turn enables the
lending institution to make home loans at a lower rate.8 Finally,
5. See notes 46-63 and accompanying text, infra.
6. An HFA or municipality needs specific statutory authorization to issue mortgage revenue bonds. In setting up a housing finance agency the legislature will typically recite the
public purpose for which it is being created. E.g., VA. CODE § 36-55.25 (1976): "It is hereby
further declared to be necessary and in the public interest that such state housing development authority provide ... mortgage financing ... for residential housing" for persons and
families of low and moderate income in this Commonwealth..
See also, S.C. CODE § 313-30 (1976).
7. See I.R.C. §103; notes 16-42 and accompanying text, infra.
8. See Smith, Tax-Free Housing Bonds Cost More Than They Are Worth, Fortune, July
2, 1979, at 86. The author reported that beneficiaries of these programs saved around 20%
in interest charges. For example, instead of paying $457 a month interest on a 30-year
$50,000 mortgage, the participant might pay only $371. See also Chicago Tribune, July 27,
1978, at 3, col. 4; Chicago Tribune, August 1, 1978, §1 at 3, col. 1. For example, in its pioneering mortgage bond program, Chicago sold its bonds at 6.9%. The lender was then able
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the issuer uses the borrower's monthly mortgage payments to pay
back the bondholders. 9
State HFA's and local governments use program structures that
are quite similar, although a state's legislature may restrict the
kinds of housing the state program can finance. 10 Several different
types of procedures are currently employed to direct the bond proceeds into the hands of individual borrowers.
Loans to Lenders. In a "loans to lenders" type program, the issuer lends the bond proceeds directly to a qualified lending institution." The lender then makes new mortgage loans to eligible borrowers. After the issuer has decided the eligibility requirements of
the program (such as income ceilings, geographical target areas, or
purchase price limits), it does not take an active role in the administration of the program. The lending institution takes over the
servicing of the mortgages.
Forward Commitment Mortgage Purchase.Under the mortgage
purchase program,12 the bond proceeds are used either to purchase
mortgages from the lending institution's own portfolio or to create
new mortgages. Typically, the issuer will make advance committo offer home loans at 7.9%, while the conventional mortgage rates ranged from 93 to 10%.
9. This fact distinguishes revenue bonds from general obligation bonds. See notes 65-66,
infra.
10. See statutes listed in note 93, infra.
11. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1622 (Cum. Supp. 1978):
Fund; loans to mortgage lenders; conditions. The fund may make, and undertake commitments to make, loans to mortgage lenders under terms and conditions
requiring the proceeds thereof to be used by such mortgage lenders to make mortgage loans for residential housing for low or moderate income persons. Mortgage
commitments or actual mortgages shall be originated through and serviced by any
bank, trust company, savings and loan association, mortgage banker, or other
financial institutions authorized to transact business in this state.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-3080.6 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 220.20 (1979); Ky. REV. STAT. §
198A.250 (Baldwin 1977); Va. Code § 36-55.32(2) (1976).
12. The Minn. Hous. Fin. Agency (MHFA) developed this procedure whereby the agency
agrees in advance to purchase below-market mortgages from participating lenders. The
lender applies for the total dollar amount of commitment desired and thereafter purchases a
commitment from the MHFA. The lender then has 6 to 12 months to originate the loans.
See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-1623 (Cum. Supp. 1978):
The fund may invest in, purchase or make commitments to invest in or
purchase ...
mortgage loans made for the construction, rehabilitation or
purchase of residential housing for low or moderate income persons. Prior to such
. . . commitment, the mortgage lender shall certify that the proceeds therefrom or
its equivalent will be reinvested in mortgages or used to make mortgage loans to
provide residential housing for low or moderate income persons. ...
See also ALASKA STAT. § 18.56.090(3) (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-3080.7 (1968); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 220.21 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 319.210 (1973); OR. REV. STAT. § 456.640 (1977);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-23-118 (1973); VA. CODE § 36-55.32(1) (1976).
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ments with the lender to purchase eligible mortgages that the
lender originated. The lender can then make below-market mortgages to persons meeting the issuer's criteria. After the bonds are
sold and the mortgages closed, the issuer purchases the mortgages
at a discount and usually allows the lender to continue servicing
the loans for a fee.
Direct Loans to Housing Developers. A major facet of any state
HFA is its program to make loans to developers of low- and moderate-income housing.13 The issuer uses the bond proceeds to provide money to the developer at below-market interest rates. The
borrower in turn is usually subject to restrictions regarding the income eligibility of those buying the units or the rates charged for
renting the units.
The successful marketing of housing issues depends on a number
of factors.1 4 First, a mortgage pool that includes substantial highand middle-income purchasers who are able to pay excessive down
payments is preferable. Second, the level of collateralization, or the
extent to which the bonds are secured by mortgages and reserves,
contributes to a favorable bond rating.1 5 Third, the treatment of
mortgage prepayments plays a decisive factor in the bond rating.
With a more favorable bond rating, the city markets its bonds at a
lower interest rate. This in turn determines the ultimate rate that
the borrower pays.
FEDERAL LAW

Section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code
Mortgage revenue bonds are in essence a federal subsidy of local
housing programs. 6 The tax-exempt interest on mortgage revenue
bonds provides income to high-bracket taxpayers that normally
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-23-117 (1973):
The agency shall be empowered to make or participate in the making of insured
mortgage loans to qualified sponsors, developers or builders of residential housing
for lower and moderate income persons and families and to lower and moderate
income persons who are purchasers of residential housing ....
Provided, however, no insured mortgage loans available under the provisions of this section shall
be made for nonowner-occupied residential housing....
ALAsKA STAT. § 18.56.090(1) (1974). This type of program can often be combined with the
Section 8 federal assistance program for an additional capital subsidy.
14. H.R. Rep. No. 96-678, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1979).
15. In Chicago's first offering, $14 million was placed in a reserve fund to be later invested in United States securities earning arbitrage. Chicago's mortgage plan may cost less
than expected, Chicago Tribune, July 26, 1978, § 4 at 3, col. 2.
16. See generally Chommie, Federal Income Taxation § 36, at 70 (1973).
13.
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would be taxed. It is estimated that for every $1 billion of out17
standing bonds, the Treasury loses $22.5 million in lost revenue.
Government bonds provide a tax-haven for high-income taxpayers because section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code1 excludes
from gross income interest on governmental obligations."9 The general exemption"0 found in section 103(a) provides that interest on
17. Tax-Exempt Bonds for Single-Family Housing (A study prepared by the Congressional Budget Office for the Subcommittee on the City of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.) at 47 (April
1979). (Hereinafter referred to as Congressional Budget Office Study.)
18. See note 135, infra.
19. A consistent criticism of the exemption is its debilitating effect on the progressive
income tax structure. See Martori & Bliss, Taxation of Municipal Bond Interest-"Interesting Speculation" and One Step Forward, 44 Notre Dame Law. 191, 214
(1968) where the authors suggest that repeal of section 103 would be a "step forward" in
restoring a strict theory of progressive income taxation. Congressional concern has produced
proposals to completely eliminate section 103. See generally Lent, The Origin and Survival
of Tax-Exempt Securities, 12 Nat'l Tax J. 301 (1959); Gabinet, The Municipal Bond Interest Exemption: Comments on a Running Battle, 24 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 64 (1972). More
recently Congress effected substantial reform in the area. See Maxwell, Exclusion from Income of Interest on State and Local Government Obligations, House Comm. on Ways &
Means, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 Tax Revision Compendium 701-703 (1959); H.R. Rep. No.
91-413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in (1969) U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1645.
Despite the dissatisfaction, the exclusion of interest on state and local bonds has endured
since the very beginning of federal income taxation. See Note, The Taxability of State and
Local Bond Interest By the Federal Government, 38 U. Cin. L. Rev. 703 (1969).
20. The exemption originated in the concept of intergovernmental immunity, see McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (4 Wheat. 316) (1819); Ratchford, Intergovernmental Tax
Immunities in the United States, 7 Nat'l Tax J. 305 (1953); Comment, Tax-Exempt State
and Local Bonds: Form of Intergovernmental Immunity and Form of Intergovernmental
Obligation, 21 DePaul L. Rev. 757 (1972); Comment, Intergovernmental Tax Immunities:
An Analysis and Suggested Approach to the Doctrine and its Application to State and
Municipal Bond Interest, 15 Vill. L. Rev. 414 (1970); and the notion that Congress may not
impair a state's essential role in a federal system of government. The tax-exempt status of
municipal bonds originated in the early Supreme Court decision of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895), where the court specifically declared that a tax on municipal interest was unconstitutional. The constitutional basis of this decision, however, was
weakened by the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913.
Over the decades, the Supreme Court has narrowed this concept, especially in relation to
intergovernmental taxation. In Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938), the court found
the salaries of state employees were not exempt from federal taxation. The court reasoned
that any constitutional immunity must be essential to the preservation of the state government's continued existence. This view was upheld in Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe,
306 U.S. 466 (1939).
The ability of state's to borrow money could be critically impaired if the exemption did
not exist. In New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946), the court stated that the
federal government may not tax state income if "it interferes unduly with the state's performance of its sovereign functions of government". Id. at 587 (concurring opinion). The
most recent Supreme Court decision on intergovernmental immunity also supports this contention. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) found that the federal government may not interfere with the "integral governmental functions" of the state. The
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"the obligation of a state . . . or any political subdivision" is not
included in gross income.2 1 The term "obligation" is given a very
narrow construction but does include obligations that are created

by the exercise of the "state's borrowing power". 2 2 Bonds are obligations specifically issued by a governmental unit to raise additional funds's and therefore involve the exercise of the state's borrowing power. Treasury regulations interpreting section 103(a)
provide that the obligation must be issued by or on behalf of the
governmental issuer.' 4 This restriction indicates that only bonds issued "in the performance of an essential governmental function
will be exempt." 5
Subsection 103(b) excludes industrial development bonds from
the general interest exemption .2 Prior to 1968, industrial develop-

court stated:
We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of sovereignty attaching
to every state government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because
Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that
manner.
Id. at 845. Consequently, courts are unlikely to rely on the constitutional basis for the exclusion on interest income when reviewing congressional regulation in the area. The continued
survival of section 103 depends more on legislative grace and social policy.
21. I.R.C. §103(a).
22. Fox v. United States, 397 F.2d 119, 122 (8th Cir. 1968) ("...the word 'obligation' is
not intended to extend to every obligation which may include interest but only to those
obligations which were created in the exercise of the state's borrowing power."); Commissioner v. Meyer, 104 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1939); Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293
U.S. 84, 87 (1934).
23. Union Planters Nat'l Bank of Memphis v. United States, 295 F. Supp. 1151 (W.D.
Tenn. 1968),
24. Tress. Reg. §1.103-(1) (1956).
25. Bryant v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 9, 13 (9th Cir. 1940); Commissioner v. Shamberg's
Estate, 144 F.2d 998, 1006 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied 323 U.S. 792 (1945); Commissioner v.
White's Estate, 144 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied 323 U.S. 792 (1945).
26. I.R.C. §103(b) provides:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, any industrial development bond shall be treated as an obligation not described in subsection (a)(1) or
(2).
(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term "industrial development bond"
means any obligation(A) which is issued as part of an issue all or a major portion of the proceeds
of which are to be used directly or indirectly in any trade or business carried on
by any person who is not an exempt person, and
(B) the payment of the principal or interest on which (under the terms of
such obligation or any underlying arrangement) is, in whole or in major part(i) secured by any interest in property used or to be used in a trade or
business or in payments in respect of such property, or
(ii) to be derived from payments in respect of property, or borrowed
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ment bonds permitted a tax loophole."" Local governments floated
these bonds to encourage industry, using the proceeds to construct
industrial plants. The issuer leased the completed project to a private business and the rental income then covered the interest due
on the bonds."8 Due to the widespread abuse of these issues and
the resulting loss of revenue to the Treasury, 9 in 1968 Congress
limited the extent to which tax-exempt securities could subsidize
industrial development. 80
The section 103(b) general denial of tax-exempt status for industrial development bonds is compromised by numerous exceptions."' Bond issues for certain industrial development activities
retain the favored tax-exempt status. a2 One exception is that for
money, used or to be used in a trade or business.
27. See Spiegel, Financing Private Ventures with Tax-Exempt Bonds: A Developing
"Truckhole" in the Tax Law, 17 Stan. L. Rev. 224 (1965). Through section 103 and several
revenue rulings issued during the 1950's and 60's, tax-exempt bonds issued by private "nonprofit" corporations flourished thereby subsidizing private industrial development.
28. See generally, Abbey, Municipal Industrial Development Bonds, 19 Vand. L. Rev.
25 (1965); Armstrong, "Municipal Inducements"- The New Mexico Commercial and Industrial Project Revenue Bond Act, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 58 (1960); Bell & Hinkle, A Guide to
Industrial Revenue Bond Financing,9 Washburn L.J. 372 (1970); Note, Incentives to IndustrialRelocation: The Municipal Industrial Bond Plans, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 898 (1953);
Current Legislation, 7 B.C. Indus. & Com. L.R. 696 (1966).
29. See Note, The Proliferationof IndustrialRevenue Bond Financing:Ban the Bond?,
41 Temple L.Q. 289 (1968). See text accompanying note 128, infra.
30. Section 107 of the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, P.L. No. 90-364
(1968) (1968-2 Cum. Bulletin 715). For a criticism of the elimination of the industrial development bond exemption, see Hendricks, Reconsideration of IndustrialDevelopment Bond
Income Tax Exemption, 48 Ore. L. Rev. 168 (1969). See also McDaniel, Federal Income
Taxation of IndustrialBonds: The Public Interest, 1 Urb. Law. 157 (1969); Mumford, Past,
Present and Future of Industrial Development Bonds, 1 Urb.Law 147 (1969); Note, The
Limited Tax-Exempt Status of Interest on Industrial Development Bonds Under Subsection 103(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1649 (1972) (assessment of
subsection 103(c)(1)-(6)).
31. See generally Ritter, Federal Income Tax Treatment of Municipal Obligations:IndustrialDevelopment Bonds, 25 Tax Law. 511 (1972); Zwick & Lange, Accounting and Tax
Treatment of Industrial Development Bonds, 7 Tax Advisor 388 (1976).
32. The exceptions include bonds used to finance facilities for sports (§103(b)(4)(B));
conventions or trade shows (§103(b)(4)(C)); specific transportation projects (§103(b)(4)(D));
sewage or solid waste disposal (§103(b)(4)(E)); air or water pollution (§103(b)(4)(F)); and
water utility (§103(b)(4)(G)). See generally Arthur & Richardson, Financing of Pollution
Control Facilities Through Tax-Exempt Bonds, 58 Chi. Bar Rec. 248 (1977); Early, Financing Pollution Control Facilities Through Industrial Development Bonds, 27 Tax Law. 85
(1973); Kutak & Wagner, Clearing the Air on Tax-Exempt Pollution Control Facility Financing, 8 Creighton L. Rev. 567 (1975); Note, Taxation: Public Purpose and Tax-Exempt
Industrial Development Revenue Bonds to Finance Pollution Abatement Facilities, 29
Okla. L. Rev. 233 (1976).
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residential real property, section 103(b)(4)(A). 3"
Under section 103(b)(4), an issuer may float tax-exempt industrial development bonds only if "substantially all" of the proceeds
are used for the exempt facility. The regulations state that the
"substantially all" test is met if 90% of the proceeds are used for
that purpose.8 4 Two rules apply to this test: (1) proceeds are reduced on a pro rata basis between those for the exempt facility and
those for other uses; and (2) amounts for the exempt facility include amounts that could be capitalized, such as taxes and interest. 5 The regulations deny an exemption where more than 10% of
the bond proceeds provide working capital for the development of
the project.8 6
The Internal Revenue Service recently ruled that no more than
10% of an issue could finance existing debt on the rehabilitation of
a multifamily housing project.3 7 In the ruling, a state had planned
to use $750,000 from the sale of municipal bonds to rehabilitate a
50-unit building. In order for the rehabilitation loan to be the first
mortgage, $250,000 of the proceeds would be needed to refinance
the existing mortgage. The ruling rejected this proposal finding
that the use of proceeds in this manner constituted working capital. As working capital is not connected with providing housing,
the "substantially all" test had not been met, i.e. a third of the
proceeds were to be used to refinance debt. The ruling has serious
implications for other state-financed rehabilitation projects, since
many issuers require they be first lienors on the project.3 8
The interest exemption for mortgage subsidy bonds can be
found either under the general exemption contained in 103(a) or
the industrial development bond exception under section
103(b)(4)(A). The applicable exemption generally depends on the
type of procedure used to direct the bond proceeds to the borrowers. Bond proceeds used in the "loans to lenders" procedure 0 fall
under the industrial development bond exception since the funds

33. I.R.C. §103(b)(4)(A).
34. Treas. Reg. §1.103-8(a)(6), T.D. 7511 (1977). See generally Ritter, Working With the
New Final Regulations on Industrial Development Bonds, 37 J. Tax. 330 (1972).
35. Treas. Reg. §1.103-8(a)(6), T.D. 7511 (1977).
36. Treas. Reg. §1.103-10(b)(1)(ii), T.D. 7511 (1977); Rev. Rul. 77-292 (1977) (1977-2
Cum. Bulletin 36).
37. Rev. Rul. 80-10, 1980-2 I.R.B. at 6.
38. Hous. & Dev. Rep., Cur. Dev. (BNA) 699 (Jan. 21, 1980), reported that the Maryland
Comm. Dev. Administration is expected to challenge this ruling.
39. See note 11, supra, and accompanying text.
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are used in the "trade or business" of the lending institution.40
Under direct loan or mortgage purchase programs, 4 the bond proceeds are not used in the trade or business of a private party but
by a governmental unit in either the distribution of loans or the
purchase of mortgages. The bonds, therefore, are not of the industrial development type but fall under the general exemption found
in section 103(a).' 2
STATE LAW

Before a mortgage subsidy bond program can be initiated, the
issuer must examine the applicable state law. State financing of
tax-exempt housing is typically done through the establishment of
housing finance agencies (HFA).4 s Municipal and county governments can issue housing bonds only if there is statutory authorization. 4 The statutes range from specific enabling legislation to
home rule provisions. Many state constitutional provisions, such as
the public purpose doctrine and debt limitations, challenge the legality of housing finance programs. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that have reviewed housing finance
legislation have found them constitutionally valid.'8
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

H.R. Rep. No. 96-678, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1979).
See notes 12-13, supra, and accompanying text.
H.R. Rep. No. 96-678, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1979).
See notes 91-97, infra, and accompanying text.
STATES WITH ACTIVE LOCAL SINGLE-FAMILY BOND
FINANCINGS: BOND ISSUERS AND LEGAL AUTHORITIES

State

Issuer

Authority

Arkansas
California
Colorado
Illinois
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Minnesota
New Mexico
West Virginia

Facilities Board
Redevelopment Agency
City or County
Home rule entity
Home rule city
County
Public trusts
Few cities/counties
Few cities
City
City or county

Facilities Board Act
Senate Bill 99
Economic Dev. Rev. Bond Law
Home rule powers
Home rule powers
Ky. Rev. Stat. §67.803
Public trust act
Special or local laws
Special laws
Home rule powers
Industrial Dev. Act.

Derived from Congressional Budget Office Study supra note 17, at 39, Table 7.
45. Walker v. Alaska State Mortgage Ass'n, 416 P.2d 245 (Alaska 1966); California Hous.
Fin. Agency v. Elliott, 131 Cal. Rptr. 361, 551 P.2d 1193 (1976); Rich v. State, 237 Ga. 291,
227 S.E.2d 761 (1976); John R. Grubb, Inc. v. Iowa Hous. Fin. Auth., 255 N.W.2d 89 (Iowa
1977); Maine State Hous. Auth. v. Depositors Trust Co., 278 A.2d 699 (Maine 1971); Massachusetts Hous. Fin. Agency v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 249 N.E.2d 599 (Mass.
1969); In re Act No. 346 of Public Acts of 1966, 380 Mich. 554, 158 N.W.2d 416 (1968)
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Public Purpose Doctrine
The public purpose doctrine requires that funds collected on behalf of a governmental unit be used for the benefit of the public."
Often the legislature determines what constitutes a "public purpose" and courts almost uniformly defer to its opinion.4
The concept of what is a "public purpose" changes to meet the
needs of society." In the 1930's, slum clearance was defined as a

(advisory opinion); Minnesota Hous. Fin. Agency v. Hatfield, 210 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1973);
State ex rel. Douglas v. Nebraska Mortgage Fin. Fund, 204 Neb. 445, 283 N.W.2d 12 (1979);
New Jersey Mortgage Fin. Agency v. McCrane, 56 N.J. 414, 267 A.2d 24 (1970); Martin v.
North Carolina Hous. Corp., 175 S.E.2d 665 (N.C. 1970); In re Or. Rev. Stat. § 456.720, 537
P.2d 542 (Or. 1975) (advisory opinion); Johnson v. Pennsylvania Hous. Fin. Agency, 453 Pa.
329, 309 A.2d 528 (1973); Opinion to the Governor, 308 A.2d 809 (R.I. 1973); West v. Tennessee Hous. Dev. Agency, 512 S.W.2d 275 (Tenn. 1974); Utah Hous. Fin. Agency v. Smart,
561 P.2d 1052 (Utah 1977); Vermont Home Mortgage Credit Agency v. Montpelier Nat'l
Bank, 262 A.2d 445 (Vt. 1970); State ex rel. West Virginia Hous. Dev. Fund v. Copenhaver,
171 S.E.2d 545 (W. Va. 1969); State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 59 Wis.2d 391, 208 N.W.2d
780 (1973). Contra, State ex rel. Brown v. Beard, 48 Ohio St.2d 290, 358 N.E.2d 569 (1976);
Casey v. South Carolina State Hous. Auth., 215 S.E.2d 184 (S.C. 1975).
46. See Iowa Const. art. III, § 31: "(N)o public money or property shall be appropriated
for local, or private purposes, unless such appropriation, compensation, or claim, be allowed
by two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the General Assembly."
For a detailed history of the "public purpose" doctrine in Wisconsin, see Mills, The Public Purpose Doctrine in Wisconsin-Part 1, 1957 Wis. L. Rev. 40. Note, Constitutional
Law-Public Purpose-Restricting Revenue Bond Financing of Private Enterprise, 52
N.C.L. Rev. 859 (1974), discusses North Carolina's minority position in interpreting the
public purpose doctrine as applied to revenue bond financing. Note, The "Public Purpose"
of Municipal Financingfor Industrial Development, 70 Yale L.J. 789 (1961).
47. See, e.g., Utah Hous. Fin. Agency v. Smart, 561 P.2d 1052, 1053 (Utah 1977); State
ex rel. Warren v. 'Nusbaum, 59 Wis.2d 391, 208 N.W.2d 780, 795 (1973); Walker v. Alaska
State Mortgage Ass'n, 416 P.2d 245, 251 (Alaska 1966) ("... the legislature's findings are
controlling in the absence of a controversy questioning their validity."); Massachusetts
Hous. Fin. Agency v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 249 N.E.2d 599, 606 (Mass. 1969)
("It is not for this court to consider whether these contentions are sound as a matter of
economics and public policy."); New York City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153, 154
(N.Y. 1936) ("It is true that the legislative findings and the determination of public use are
not conclusive on the courts .... But they are entitled at least to great respect .... ");
Martin v. North Carolina Hous. Corp., 175 S.E.2d 665, 671 (N.C. 1970) ("... questions as
to public policy are for legislative determination."); Vermont Home Mortgage Credit Agency
v. Montpelier Nat'l Bank, 262 A.2d 445, 448 (Vt. 1970) ("As for the purpose of the act and
the legislative intent, we must take the lawmakers at their word, as stated in the statute.").
48. See New Jersey Mortgage Fin. Agency v. McCrane, 56 N.J. 414, 267 A.2d 24, 27
(1970); In ABA Advisory Commission on Housing and Urban Growth, Housing For All
Under Law 485-486 (ed. R. Fishman 1978), the commission notes that public purpose is an
expanding concept but that the courts have evolved three principles to determine this issue:
(1) benefit to the community as a whole, (2) direct relation to the functions of government,
and (3) primary objective not the promotion of private ends (though private interest may
derive an incidental benefit from the activity).
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public purpose. 9 Gradually court decisions expanded this concept
into the notion of providing housing to those who cannot afford it
on the private market. 0 Today, it is unquestionably within the police power of the legislature to deal with the shortage of decent
housing. 5'
Typically, the legislature, in establishing an HFA, determines
that there exists a "scarcity of safe and sanitary housing".5 2 This
housing shortage contributes to "blighted slum areas" which constitute a menace to the health, safety, morals and welfare of the
citizenry.5 3 The legislative findings conclude that the "operation of

49. Early court decisions tied the public purpose of providing housing to the elimination
of slums. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed this notion in Allydon Realty Corp. v.
Holyoke Hous. Auth., 304 Mass. 288, 23 N.E.2d 665 (1939):
The requirement that the rents be within the financial reach of families who are
in the lowest income group . . . is doubtless intended as an additional guaranty
that the provision of low-rent housing will result in the permanent elimination of
the slums ....

The real purpose of the statute is therefore the elimination of

slums and unsafe and unsanitary dwellings, and the money expended for low-rent
housing is only a means by which the main object is to be accomplished. The
statute as a whole is designed to serve a public need, and the money expended for
low-rent housing, as well as that expended for slum clearance, is for a public use.
23 N.E.2d at 668-69. See also State v. Housing Auth. of New Orleans, 190 La. 710, 182 So.
725, 734 (1938); Knoxville Hous. Auth. v. Knoxville, 123 S.W.2d 1085, 1087 (Tenn. 1939).
50. Oklahoma City v. Sanders, 94 F.2d 323, 327 (10th Cir. 1938) (applying Oklahoma
law); United States v. Certain Lands in Louisville, 78 F.2d 684, 686-688 (6th Cir. 1935)
(applying Kentucky law); Willmon v. Powell, 91 Cal. App. 1, 266 P. 1029, 1031 (1928); Marvin v. Housing Auth. of Jacksonville, 133 Fla. 590, 183 So. 145, 148 (1938); Williamson v.
Housing Auth. of Augusta, 186 Ga. 673, 199 S.E. 43, 48 (1938); Krause v. Peoria Hous.
Auth., 370 I11.356, 19 N.E.2d 193, 200 (1939); Edwards v. Housing Auth. of Muncie, 19
N.E.2d 741, 744 (Ind. 1939); Spahn v. Stewart, 268 Ky. 97, 103 S.W.2d 651, 655-656 (1937);
Rutherford v. Great Falls, 107 Mont. 512, 86 P.2d 656, 658 (1939); State v. City Council of
Helena, 90 P.2d 514, 517-518 (Mont. 1939); Wells v. Housing Auth., 213 N.C. 744, 197 S.E.
693 (1938); Dornan v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 331 Pa. 209, 200 A. 834, 840 (1938); McNulty v. Owens, 188 S.C. 377, 199 S.E. 425, 428-430 (1938); Chapman v. Huntington Hous.
Auth., 3 S.E.2d 502, 507-508 (W. Va. 1939). Compare Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 (1920)
with previously cited authorities.
51. See, e.g., Walker v. Alaska State Mortgage Ass'n, 416 P.2d 245, 252 (Alaska 1966)
("Housing (and its effect upon the health, safety, welfare, comfort and security of this
state's citizens) as well as the economic climate of the state are legitimate legislative purposes."); Minnesota Hous. Fin. Agency v. Hatfield, 210 N.W.2d 298, 305 (Minn. 1973); Johnson v. Pennsylvania Hous. Fin. Agency, 309 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. 1973).
52. E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-44(a)-2 (1978) ("... there continued to exist throughout
the state a seriously inadequate supply of safe and sanitary dwelling accommodations...").
See ALASKA STAT. § 18.56.010(a) (1974); COLo. REv. STAT. § 29-4-702 (1973); ME, REV. STAT.
tit. 30, § 4553 (1978); MD. ANN. COD art. 41, § 266DD-1 (1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
35-502 (1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122A-2 (1974); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3735.26 (Page
1971); VA. CODE § 36-55.25(a) (1976).
53. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 319.020(2) (1973) ("This condition is conducive to disease,
crime, environmental decline and poverty ...

and is a menace to the health, safety, morals
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private enterprise" cannot relieve such conditions.5 As a consequence, the legislature declares it a public purpose for the state to
increase the amount of financing for low- and moderate-income
5s
housing.
In examining housing finance legislation, courts have found that
a "public purpose" exists even though the act confers benefits
upon private individuals."0 Most jurisdictions have found that the
increased availability of mortgage funds tends to prevent blight
and urban decay. 57 Homeownership promotes stable rather than
transient communities' s As the byproducts of substandard housing (such as crime and disease) are not confined geographically, the
entire state benefits from the mortgage revenue bonds even though
only particular communities are the direct beneficiaries."9 Unless

and welfare of the citizens of this state."). See ALASKA STAT. § 18.56.010(c) (1974); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 19-3080.1 (1968); S.C. CODE § 31-3-30(a) (1976).
54. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 319.020(6) (1973) ("The ordinary operations of private enterprise have not in the past corrected these conditions."). See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
198A.020(2) (Baldwin 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122A-2 (1974); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
1680.102(5) (Purdon 1977); VA. CODE § 36-55.25(c) (1976).
55. E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-44(a)-2 (1978) ("It is declared that all the foregoing are
public purposes and uses for which public moneys may be borrowed. . ."). See ALASKA
STAT. § 18.56.010(c) (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-3080.1 (2.02) (1968); Ky. REV. STAT. §
198A.020(4) (1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 266DD-l(a) (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. §
319.020(10) (1973); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1680.102(7) (Purdon 1977); VA. CODE § 3655.25 (1976).
56. See, e.g., West v. Tennessee Hous. Dev. Agency, 512 S.W.2d 275, 280 (Tenn. 1974)
("(T)he economic stress which one individual, or household, or firm, experiences has an
effect on the economic well being of us all. It makes no sense to argue that this plan will
benefit only one sector of the economy. . . ."); Martin v. North Carolina Hous. Corp., 277
N.C. 29, 175 S.E.2d 665, 672 (1970); Utah Hous. Fin. Agency v. Smart, 561 P.2d 1052, 1054
(Utah 1977); State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 2d 391, 208 N.W.2d 780, 797 (1973).
Courts have found a public purpose even when the individuals benefitting from the funds
are of moderate means. In John R. Grubb, Inc. v. Iowa Hous. Fin. Auth., 255 N.W.2d 89
(Iowa 1977), the court sustained the constitutional validity of the housing act despite the
fact that high-income families could benefit from the program.
57. See, e.g., Utah Hous. Fin. Agency v. Smart, 561 P.2d 1052, 1054 (Utah 1977): "Increasing the transferability of low and middle income housing by increasing financing therefore, and increasing the availability of funds for home improvements on such housing, tends
to prevent the creation of blight and slums and the consequent unsafe, overcrowded conditions which breed crime and disease."; California Hous. Fin. Agency v. Elliott, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 361, 551 P.2d 1193, 1199 (1976); Minnesota Hous. Fin. Agency v. Hatfield, 210 N.W.2d
298, 306 (Minn. 1973).
58. See, e.g., State ex rel. Douglas v. Nebraska Mortgage Fin. Fund, 204 Neb. 445, 283
N.W.2d 12, 21 (1979).
59. See Maine State Hous. Auth. v. Depositors Trust Co., 278 A.2d 699, 705 (Me. 1971)
("The elimination of such overcrowded, unsanitary and unsafe dwelling accommodations
• . . has a clear relationship to the health, safety, morals and welfare of the people as a
whole and serves a public purpose."); New York City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153,
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the act primarily benefits private persons and only indirectly affects the public interest, the courts will not interfere with the legis6
lative judgement. 0
Even though a public purpose is served by providing housing,
the means employed to achieve this end are open to constitutional
attack. Opponents typically allege that the revenue bonds adopted
by the housing act are not reasonably designed to achieve the
"public purpose" of increasing the supply of housing. 1 Courts,
again, invariably defer to the legislature and find that the issuance
of mortgage revenue bonds make funds available at more "economically feasible rates". 2 The courts decline to determine whether
the legislature employed the best possible means. 8
Debt Restrictions
State constitutions often put restrictions on the amount of debt
the state can incur." Most courts, however, define state debt to
include only legally enforceable obligations against the state. As a
consequence, states often establish HFAs as independent entities;
thus, revenue bonds issued by the HFAs do not create any legally
binding debt on the state.6 The "special fund" doctrine6 6 provides

154 (N.Y. 1936).
60. E.g., Martin v. North Carolina Hous. Corp., 277 N.C. 29, 175 S.E.2d 665, 673 (N.C.
1970) ("A legislative declaration which asserts in general terms that the statute under consideration is enacted for a public purpose, although entitled to great weight is not conclusive. When the facts are determined, what is a public purpose is a question of law for the
court."); California Hous. Fin. Agency v. Elliott, 131 Cal. Rptr. 361, 551 P.2d 1193, 1198
(1976); Minnesota Hous. Fin. Agency v. Hatfield, 210 N.W.2d 298, 305 (Minn. 1973).
61. See, e.g., West v. Tennessee Hous. Dev. Agency, 512 S.W.2d 275 (Tenn. 1974).
62. Id. at 280.
63. See Vermont Home Mortgage Credit Agency v. Montpelier Nat'l Bank, 262 A.2d
445, 449 (Vt. 1970) (court found that it was not called upon to pass judgment on whether
means adopted by legislature represented sound policy); Cremer v. Peoria Hous. Auth., 399
I1. 579, 78 N.E.2d 276, 283 (1948) (court could not say as a matter of law that administrative techniques devised for promoting new housing were inappropriate).
64. See, e.g., Colo. Const. art. XI, § 3:
The state shall not contract any debt by loan in any form, except to provide for
casual deficiencies of revenue ... and the amount of debt contracted in any one
year to provide for deficiencies of revenue, shall not exceed one-fourth of a mill on
each dollar of valuation of taxable property within the state, and the aggregate
amount of such debt shall not at any time exceed three-fourths of a mill on each
dollar of said valuation, until the valuation shall equal one hundred millions of
dollars. ...
65. ALASKA STAT. § 18-56.020 (1974); COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-4-720 (1973); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 198A.070 (Baldwin 1977); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1680.502(a) (Purdon 1977); NEB.
REv. STAT. § 76-1630 (1978); NEV.REV.STAT. § 319.380(2) (1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122A-6
(1974); UTAH CODE, § 63-44(a)-15 (1978); VA. CODE § 36-55.46 (1976).
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another method of bypassing state debt restrictions. When a debt
is paid out of special funds (such as mortgage payments) rather
than the "general" funds of a state, the debt restrictions do not
apply.6"
The obligation of a state to repay the bondholders on default
may be subject to a moral obligation clause. 68 This type of
"makeup" provision is frequently added to bond issues to make
them more appealing to investors by implying that the state is obligated in the event of default.s The effect of the clause is somewhat misleading because most courts find that the clause does not
create any legal liability on the part of the state.
Courts addressing housing finance legislation are often faced
with the issue whether an HFA's ability to sell bonds involves an
unconstitutional pledging of the state's credit to an individual.7
Most jurisdictions have found that borrowing by an HFA does not
66. The origin of the special fund doctrine is attributed to Winston v. City of Spokane,
12 Wash. 524, 41 P. 888 (1895). In Winston, the city repaid a loan that was used to complete
a waterworks project out of a "special fund" derived from the waterwork's receipts.
67. See State ex rel. Douglas v. Nebraska Mortgage Fin. Fund, 204 Neb. 445, 283
N.W.2d 12, 23 (1979). See also Commissioner v. Shamberg's Estate, 14 F.2d 998, 1006 (2d
Cir. 1944), cert. denied 323 U.S. 792 (1942) (court held municipal bonds tax-exempt even
though payment was to be made only out of "special funds" and the credit of the municipalities was not pledged).
68. Moral obligation clauses are non-binding promises implying that in case of default
the state would take up the deficit out of a sense of moral duty. See generally Griffith,
"Moral Obligation" Bonds: Illusion or Security?, 8 Urb. Law. 54 (1976); Salsich, Housing
Finance Agencies: Instruments of State Housing Policy or Confused Hybrids?,21 St. Louis
U.L.J. 595, 599-606 (1978).
69. Moral obligation clauses typically take the form of reserve make-up provisions. See,
e.g., N.Y. Priv. Hous. Fin. Law § 47(d) (McKinney 1976):
In order further to assure such maintenance of the capital reserve fund, there
shall be annually apportioned and paid to the agency for deposit in the capital
reserve fund such sum, if any, as shall be certified by the chairman of the agency
to the governor and director of the budget as necessary to restore the capital reserve fund to an amount equal to the maximum account of principal and interest
maturing and becoming due in any succeeding calendar year on the bonds....
70. See, e.g., Maine State Hous. Auth. v. Depositors Trust Co., 278 A.2d 699, 708 (Me.
1971) ("... the Legislature . . . intended only to express to its successors an expectation
and aspiration that the project might be found worthy of financial assistance, if later
needed."); Massachusetts Hous. Fin. Agency v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 249
N.E.2d 599, 609 (Mass. 1969) (". . . no purchaser or holder of MHFA's bonds or notes has
any basis whatsoever for relying to any extent on any appropriation under [the authorizing
statutel .. ").
71. Iowa Const. art. VII, § 1: "The credit of the State shall not, in any manner, be given
or loaned to, or in aid of, any individual, association, or corporation; and the State shall
never assume, or become responsible for, the debts or liabilities of any individual, associa"
tion, or corporation ....
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violate the credit provision.

If the provision suggests that the

maintenance of reserve funds is discretionary, the courts have no
difficulty in finding that the state did not make a binding commitment and, therefore, did not pledge its credit.1 ' Even when the applicable housing act requires the state to maintain the bond reserve fund, courts have upheld the legislation. 5
Other Constitutional Limitations

Many state constitutions prohibit the legislature from abdicating
its power to any agency.7 6 The legislature may, however, delegate a
select portion of its authority to an agency if it sufficiently
prescribes the standards under which the agency will work. State
statutes generally define the powers of an HFA, tightly controlling
the types of programs employed and the eligibility requirements of
the beneficiaries. Most housing finance acts, therefore, withstand
the challenge that the delegation of legislative power is
impermissible."
In West v. Tennessee Housing Development Agency,7 " opponents of an HFA argued that the act's vague restrictions allowed
the agency to define the criteria for eligibility. The court rejected
this argument because the act required the agency to consider a
number of factors when determining income eligibility.7 ° The act,
72. See note 74, infra.
73. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 220.27(4) (1979) ("... the governor may submit to both
(emphasis
houses . . . the sum, if any, required to restore each bond reserve fund.)
added); VA. CODE § 36-55.48 (1976).
74. See John R. Grubb, Inc. v. Iowa Hous. Fin. Auth., 255 N.W.2d 89, 98 (Iowa 1977);
Massachusetts Hous. Fin. Agency v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 249 N.E.2d 599,
609 (Mass. 1969); In re Or. Rev. Stat. § 456.720, 537 P.2d 542, 545 (Or. 1975). Only two
jurisdictions have found a housing authority act to be unconstitutional because it violated
the "pledging of state credit" provision. See State ex rel. Brown v. Beard, 48 Ohio St.2d 290,
358 N.E.2d 569 (1976); Casey v. South Carolina State Hous. Auth., 215 S.E.2d 184 (S.C.
1975).
75. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. tit. 30, § 4761(3) (1978); MONT. RaV. CODES ANN. § 35-517
(Cum. Supp. 1977); OR. REV. STAT. § 456.720(5) (1977).
76. Colo. Const. art. V, § 35: "The general assembly shall not delegate to any special
commission, private corporation or association, any power to make, supervise or interfere
with any municipal improvement, money, property or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, or to levy taxes or perform any municipal function whatever."
77. See John R. Grubb, Inc. v. Iowa Hous. Fin. Auth., 255 N.W.2d 89, 99 (Iowa 1977);
Martin v. North Carolina Hous. Corp., 175 S.E.2d 665, 680 (N.C. 1970); Johnson v. Pennsylvania Hous. Fin. Agency, 453 Pa. 329, 309 A.2d 528, 534 (1973).
78. 512 S.W.2d 275 (Tenn. 1974).
79. The housing act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-23-103(10) (1979), stated:
In establishing these income limits, the board of directors shall be required to
take into consideration...
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therefore, did not give the agency "unbridled authority".8 0 The
Massachusetts Supreme Court, in a similar case, 81 found that although the act contained no guidelines as to what constituted
"low-income", the HFA could employ a "reasonable standard" in
defining that term. Most courts rationalize that the necessities of
modern government require the legislature to use broad standards
when delegating power.
Other constitutional attacks vary with each state. Where legislation grants an HFA's property tax-exempt status,"s challengers
contend that the exemption improperly benefits private individuals. Nevertheless, in most jurisdictions, the exemption is upheld as
constitutional because the program serves a public purpose." Because Iowa's HFA could forgive mortgage loans, opponents alleged
that the statute violated a state constitutional provision prohibiting gifts to private individuals." The court sustained the procedure, finding a public purpose in permitting borrowers to avoid
bankruptcy. 8 Additionally unsuccessful challenges have been
based on (1) the state privileges and immunities clause, 8 (2) the
state due process clause," and (3) a provision prohibiting an inde(a) The amount of the total income of such persons and families available for
housing needs;
(b) The size of the family;
(c) The cost and condition of housing facilities available . . .
(d) The eligibility of such persons and families for federal housing
assistance. .. ;
(e) The ability of such persons and families to compete successfully in the normal housing market ...
80. 512 S.W.2d 275, 282 (Tenn. 1974).
81. Massachusetts Hous. Fin. Agency v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 249
N.E.2d 599 (Mass. 1969).
82. E.g., id. at 607.
83. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.56.190 (1974); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 19-3080-11 (1968); OR.
REv. STAT. § 456.665 (1977).
84. See Rich v. State, 237 Ga. 291, 227 S.E.2d 761, 768 (1976); West v. Tennessee Hous.
Dev. Agency, 512 S.W.2d 275, 284 (Tenn. 1974); Martin v. North Carolina Hous. Corp., 175
S.E.2d 665, 681 (N.C. 1970); Johnson v. Pennsylvania Hous. Fin. Agency, 453 Pa. 329, 309
A.2d 528, 537 (1973).
85. John R. Grubb, Inc. v. Iowa Hous. Fin. Auth., 255 N.W.2d 89, 93 (Iowa 1977).
86. Id. at 93.
87. See State ex rel. Douglas v. Nebraska Mortgage Fin. Fund, 204 Neb. 445, 283
N.W.2d 12, 25 (1979) (court found the Act permissible since it applies equally to all persons
within the class).
88. See Walker v. Alaska State Mortgage Ass'n, 416 P.2d 245 (Alaska 1966). Opponents
argued that the act was unconstitutional in that it attempted to create an independent
agency which was not in fact within the Department of Commerce. The court rejected this
argument finding that the agency was essentially within the Department of Commerce as
the legislature stated.

Mortgage Revenue Bonds

1980]
pendent agency
department."9

not

within

a

constitutionally

mandated

THE GROWTH OF MORTGAGE REVENUE BOND FINANCING

In the past, the federal government has subsidized homeownership through several avenues. These programs were financed
through budgetary outlays, tax expenditures and the off-budget
outlays of federally-sponsored housing credit agencies."0 Many persons of moderate income seeking governmental aid in purchasing a
home were not eligible for these type of federal programs, however.
In addition, priorities in national housing policy may shift without
taking into consideration the particular needs of a community. For
these reasons, federal programs alone could not solve the nation's
housing problems.
With the creation of the first state housing finance agency
(HFA) in 1961,91 state governments began to assume greater responsibility for solving the problems of housing shortages and urban decay. 2 Today nearly every state has some form of housing
finance agency." Typically, an HFA is set up as a quasi-indepen89. See John R. Grubb, Inc. v. Iowa Hous. Fin. Auth., 255 N.W.2d 89, 97 (Iowa 1977)
(court found that the Act did not deny due process on the theory that it had no rational
relationship to the public health, safety and welfare).
90. Hearings on H.R. 3712, supra note 4, at 47.
91. N.Y. Priv. Hous. Fin. Law § 41 (McKinney 1960).
92. See Report of ABA Comm. on Housing and Urban Development, subcommittee on
State and Local Housing Dev. Legislation and Programs, Development of State Housing
Finance Agencies, 9 Real Prop., Prob. & Tr. J. 471 (1974), for a historical analysis of state
activity in housing development authorities.
93. ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.56.010-.210 (Cum. Supp. 1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-3080.1-.22
(1968); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-4-701 to 732 (1973); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 8-241 to 265C
(West 1972); Del. Code tit. 31, §§ 4050-4067 (Revised 1974); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 99-3601 to
3616 (1976); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 356-5 to 30 (1976); Idaho Code §§ 67-6201 to 6225 (1973);
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 671/2, §§ 301-334 (1973); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 220.1-.36 (West 1979); Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 198A.010-.250 (Baldwin 1977); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 40:451-:491 (West
1977); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 30, §§ 4551-4773 (1978); Md. Ann. Code art. 41, §§ 266DD-1 to -6
(1978); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 23A, §§ 1-1 to -13 (West 1973); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§§ 125.1401-.1465 (1976); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 462A.01-.24 (1979); Mo. Ann. Stat. §§
215.010-.250 (Vernon 1979); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 35-501 to 526 (1977); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§§ 76-1601 to 1651 (Cum. Supp. 1978); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 319.010 to .390 (1973); N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 204B:1-:45; N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 17:1B-4 to -25 (West Supp. 1979); N.M. Stat.
Ann. §§ 58-18-1 to -27 (1978); N.Y. Priv. Hous. Fin. Law §§ 40-60 (McKinney); N.Y. Pub.
Hous. Law §§ 10-19 (McKinney); N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law, §§ 2400-2488 (McKinney); N.C.
Gen. Stat. §§ 122A-1 to -23 (1974); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3735.01-.70 (Page 1971); Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 60, §176, tit. 63, § 1051-1099 (West 1973) (reference is to public trust act of
state under which agency is created); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 456.550-.720 (1977); 35 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. §§ 1680.101-.508(a) (Purdon 1977); S.C. Code §§ 31-3-110 to 150 (1976); S.D.
Compiled Laws Ann. §§ 28-19-1 to 162 (1976); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 13-23-101 to 23-133
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dent agency of the states' for the broad "public purpose" of alleviating the high cost of housing and stimulating construction. 5 By
issuing tax-exempt revenue bonds, the HFA is able to obtain funds
at interest rates lower than those paid on comparable securities.9
The agency then uses the funds to aid eligible borrowers in obtaining cheaper mortgages.97
Prior to 1978, most state HFA bonds financed multi-family
rental housing for persons with low- and middle-incomes.98 In the
early 1970's, however, HFAs began to issue tax-exempt revenue
bonds for middle-class, owner-occupied housing.9 9 A Congressional
report showed that from 1971-1977, the volume of HFA bonds for
single-family housing ranged from $36 million to $959 million annually."' 0 In 1978, the volume of bonds for owner-occupied housing
climbed to $2.8 billion, or 62% of all bonds floated by HFAs.' 0 '
Also beginning in mid-1978, numerous local governments issued
bonds for owner-occupied housing. 10 2 Prior to this time the issuance of single-family housing bonds by a city or county was a novel
concept. 0 3 Most localities did not have the existing legislative authority to issue bonds of this kind.'0" After the success of the initial issues, municipal participation in this tax-free market expanded greatly.0 5 In 1978, local governments issued $550 million

(1973); Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-44(a)-i to -20 (1978); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §§ 601-643; Va.
Code §§ 36-55.24-.52 (1976); W. Va. Code §§ 16-15-1 to -25 (1979); Wyo. Stat. §§ 9-18-101 to
9-18-123 (1977).
94. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 18.56.020 (Cum. Supp. 1974): "The Alaska Housing Finance
Corporation is a public corporation and government instrumentality within the Department
of Commerce, but having a legal existence independent of and separate from the state."
95. See, e.g., 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1680.102 (Purdon 1977): "(T)he 'Pennsylvania
Housing Finance Agency' . . . shall exist and operate for the purposes of alleviating the
hardship which results from insufficient production of private homes and of rental housing
for persons and families of low and moderate income ....
such purposes are public purposes for which public money may be spent." See notes 46-63, supra, and accompanying
text.
96. See notes 24-25, supra, and accompanying text.
97. See notes 8-13, supra, and accompanying text. Hous. & Dev. Rep., Ref. File (BNA)
50:0011 (Nov. 17, 1977).
98. Hous. & Dev. Rep., Ref. File (BNA) 50:0015 (Nov. 17, 1977).
99. H.R. Rep. No. 96-678, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1979).
100. Id.
101. Congressional Budget Office Study, supra note 17, at 25.
102. Id. at 37.
103. See Jim Lopp's Innovative Bonds, Business Week, Nov. 13, 1978, at 108; Hearings
on H.R. 3712, supra note 4, at 10-11.
104. See note 44, supra.
105. Chicago Tribune, March 18, 1979, §N14 at 2A, col. 1., reported that by the end of
1978, in addition to Chicago, 22 local governments in 8 states had issued $600 million in
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worth of single-family mortgage bonds; in the first quarter of 1979,
$1 billion in bonds were issued.'"
State HFAs, counties, and cities marketed a growing percentage
of their housing bonds to finance single-family housing. In 1978,
owner-occupied housing bonds represented 7.4% of all tax-exempt
bonds issued for any purpose by state and local governments. After
the first four months of 1979, this figure had risen to 26.4% .107 The
borrowing power of state and local governments was increasingly
used to finance single-family housing for moderate-income
families.
The great expansion in the use of mortgage revenue bonds is due
to three factors. First, local politicians have the impression that
the bonds cost the issuer nothing. For example, a city incurs no
liability in issuing the bonds because it is only liable on general
obligation bonds that pledge the full faith and credit of the municipality's taxing power.10 8 The interest and principal payments of
the mortgage revenue bonds are not derived from the city's taxes
but from the mortgage payments generated by the program itself. 10 9 The moral obligation clauses attached to some revenue
bonds imply that the city is liable, but the actual risk of default is

bonds. In the last 4 years, the total amount of these issues had increased 400%. See also
Hearings on H.R. 3712, supra note 4, Table 1 at 53-54.
106. Congressional Budget Office Study, supra note 17, at 37.
107.
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF PURPOSES FOR ISSUING
TAX-EXEMPT BONDS BY STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, 1976-79"
(Percent)
Activity

1976

1977

1978

1979*

Owner-occupied housing
Multi-family rental housing
Education
Water and sewer
Highways, bridges, and tunnels
Gas and Electric
Industrial development
Pollution control
Hospital
Various purposes

1.8
4.3
15.3
9.8
4.6
13.2
1.1
7.9
8.1
34.0

1.9
3.4
11.3
10.0
3.1
12.7
1.1
8.6
10.4
37.4

7.4
5.4
13.5
9.7
4.1
13.0
1.3
7.5
6.8
31.2

26.4
4.8
11.6
7.5
3.3
13.2
1.6
6.0
4.9
20.7

*Estimate of distribution through April 24, 1979.
Table 2, H.R. Rep. No. 96-678, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1979).
108. See notes 65-70, supra, and accompanying text.
109. Revenue bonds are repaid solely from the revenues of the project for which they are
issued. General obligation bonds, on the other hand, pledge the taxing power of the governmental unit issuing the bonds.
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placed on the investors rather than the issuer.1 10
The second reason for the success of the bond issues is their attractiveness to investors. The tax-exempt status of the bonds offers
a substantial tax break to high-income investors."1 Although the
investor carries the risk of default, the actual risk is minimal. The
pool of mortgage loans and a reserve account provide adequate security for the issue. In addition, private insurers and government
programs insure payment on default. 1 2 The bondholder receives a
secure investment as well as one that is tax-free.
The final factor contributing to the growth of these bonds is the
wide percentage difference between mortgage rates and tax-exempt
bond interest rates. Local governments did not issue housing bonds
in substantial amounts prior to 1978 because housing finance programs were not economically profitable. Tax-exempt bond interest
rates were comparable to conventional mortgage rates and the issuer was not able to give a lower rate to the borrower. Increasing
inflation, however, has reduced the availability of funds from traditional mortgage lenders.1 13 At the same time, the number of potential home buyers has steadily grown, thereby contributing to the
demand for single-family housing."" When interest rates recently
outstripped usery laws,11 5 mortgage revenue bonds provided the
only source of capital for mortgage lenders. Furthermore, as many
of the potential beneficiaries of mortgage revenue programs do not
qualify for federal homeownership subsidies,"" mortgage revenue
bond financing came to the rescue just when conventional mortgages slipped out of reach.

110.

See notes 68-70, supra, and accompanying text.

111.

See note 135, infra.

112. See State Housing Finance and Mortgage FinanceAgencies: A Guide For Municipal Bond Investors 2-3, Appendix B (July, 1977) (prepared by Continental I11.Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. of Chicago).
113. See The Housing Slump, Newsweek, Jan. 28, 1980, at 62 reported the building rate
projection for 1980 would be 1.5 million units-25% below 1979 and 35% behind 1978.
Nevertheless, the major negative factor in the housing market is the lack of mortgage
money.
114. The increase in the demand for housing has been attributed to several factors: (1)
the post-WW II baby boom is now putting more persons in the home buying range; (2)
housing is considered a good investment in times of inflation; and (3) "changing lifestyles
are causing more household formations". Congressional Budget Office Study, supra note 17,
at 4.
115.

See Housing: Shut the Door, Newsweek, Nov. 12, 1979, at 85.

116.

See Table next page

19801

Mortgage Revenue Bonds
.~ ci ~

-.

~o a~ Co
u~ -

C~

10

4)

CJ

Co C~ ~O ~
Co -

-

-10

.

.2

Cl
c,~

0

-

~~.

Co -

~.

-

-

u~

-00

IC

Cl 0010

O~ 0000

IC

o
CO C'~

p..,4

~

000

0j~

&o C CQ 00
wo m

00

006-

0

0

-

.;

018

10

494

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 11

The Benefits

The basic benefit derived from tax-free housing bonds is that
homebuyers are able to obtain more affordable home mortgages.
The primary aim of all local programs has been to reduce the costs
of homeownership." ' In addition, some local programs have included as their goal the redevelopment of blighted areas. 118 When

Chicago introduced the first municipal mortgage bond program in
July, 1978, city officials hoped to attract suburbanites back into
the city as well as to deter the migration of city residents to the
suburbs.119 Expected collateral benefits were an increase in the tax
base and the attraction of additional industry to the area. 120
The increased involvement of state and local governments in the
problems of housing development has generally been regarded as
beneficial." 1 Proponents of mortgage bond programs applaud the
initiative shown by municipalities in creating a viable housing program-without the aid of federal bureaucracies.122 Local governments cannot control mortgage revenue bond programs as much as
the federal government can control direct spending programs. Nevertheless, the mortgage revenue bond programs were created with
relative ease requiring little red tape. One commentator has contrasted the remarkable success of the Chicago plan in providing
low-cost housing with less successful federal programs.12 3
The explosive growth of this financing mechanism is not surprising when one considers that-the municipal bond investor acquires
additional tax-free income; the beleaguered home buyer gets a bargain mortgage; the local public officials make their24 constituents
happy; and a few administrators receive large fees.1
117. Congressional Budget Office Study, supra note 17, at 9.
118. In California, localities can initiate redevelopment programs for construction or rehabilitation within blighted neighborhoods.
119. See City Council Passes Mortgage Pool Plan, Chicago Tribune, July 8, 1978, §N1
at 1, col. 5.
120. See Chicago Tribune, July 3, 1978, §1 at 12, col. 1. The editorial commends the
program for "helping to maintain the residential vitality of the city".
121. See generally ABA Advisory Commission on Housing and Urban Growth, Housing
for All Under Law 481 (ed. R. Fishman 1978).
122. See note 3, supra, and accompanying remarks.
123. See generally A New Way to Go, Wall St. J., April 16, 1979, at 22, col. 1. One
proponent of mortgage bond programs commented that years of federal housing programs
have often left only new city slums with empty mortgage-defaulted homes. Chicago Tribune,
July 4, 1978, at 3, col. 1.
124. In Chicago's first $100,000,000 offering of mortgage bonds, the underwriter received
$3 million off the top to cover expenses. In addition, the lender charged 3% for any loans
they serviced plus $100 closing costs. Chicago Tribune, §4 at 3, col. 2.
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Criticism

The controversy surrounding mortgage revenue bonds has generally focused on the issue of who is to benefit from the funds. Critics have called the housing programs "cookie jars for the rich".1 25
Although most local programs were explicitly designated for lowand middle-income buyers, wide variations in income ceilings existed among the various programs."2 6 Income limits ranged from
$18,000 (Pueblo, Colorado) to $60,000 (Anchorage, Alaska). California's redevelopment programs had no income ceilings at all.
Municipalities defended the relatively high income ceilings as necessary to market the bonds,12 7 despite the fact that housing bond
issues with low-income limits have been successfully marketed. Because the Treasury loses tax revenues from these issues, the federal
government in effect was subsidizing moderate- and even high-income home buyers. 2 8 Providing cut-rate mortgages to persons with
$60,000 incomes ignored the "public purpose" aspect of these
programs.2 9
125. Chicago Tribune, July 8, 1979, §N1 at 6, col. 1E. The editorial remarks that the
phrase misses the point since the mortgage revenue bond plan was not envisioned as another program to aid the poor. The editorial suggests that the success of the plan should be
determined by whether it helps people invest in houses who would not otherwise be able to
do so, not by whether it helps a particular income group.
126. Some Tax-Exempt Single Family Housing Bonds Issued By Local Governments as
of April 1, 1979, and Their Income Ceilings.
Issuing City
Income
Issuing City
Income
or County
Ceiling
or County
Ceiling
Anchorage, Alaska
Sebastian Co., Arkansas
Jonesboro, Arkansas
Fresno, California
Pueblo Co., Colo.
Denver, Colo.
Wilmington, Del.
Chicago, Illinois
Evanston, Illinois

60,000
27,500
39,500
none
18,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000

Johnson Co., Ky.
E. Baton Rouge, La.
New Orleans, La.
Montgomery Co., Md.
Baltimore, Md.
Minneapolis, Minn.
Albuquerque, N.M.
Clovis, New Mexico
Wood Co., W. Va.

40,000
29,500
40,000
19,500
none
22,000
24,000
28,000
30,000

Derived from Congressional Budget Office Study, supra note 17.
127. In order to keep interest rates on the bonds low and still attract bond purchasers, a
high quality mortgage pool was needed to provide security thereby insuring the feasibility of
the entire program.
128. In 1978, $3 billion of mortgage revenue bonds were floated. These cost the federal
government more than $67.5 million in lost revenues. The projected revenue loss due to
mortgage revenue bonds in 1984 is expected to range between $1.6 and $2.1 billion. See
Congressional Budget Office Study, supra note 17, at 47.
129. The Chicago Reporter (a monthly information service on racial issues in metropolitan Chicago) conducted a study on the breakdown of loan recipients in the first mortgage
plan issued by Chicago. The study claimed that "because the city counted only 'adjusted
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Mortgage revenue bond programs have not proved as beneficial
to the community as originally hoped. The goal of attracting suburbanites back into the city was not realized. Competing suburban
mortgage programs cancelled out the benefits of municipal mortgage revenue bonds.13 0 In Chicago, the relative flux of families
moving back into the city was negligible. '1 1 In addition, local bond
programs threatened to impair or replace traditional mortgage
financing, thereby altering the role of lenders in the mortgage market.13 2 If local governments replace traditional mortgage lenders,
social or political, rather than economic, criteria may be used to
determine eligibility requirements for homeownership. The Treasury Department has expressed concern that local government is
infringing upon free enterprise in this large sector of the
economy. 33
More serious criticism focuses on the effect mortgage revenue
bonds have on the municipal bond market. 34 First, the number of
persons who can profit from buying tax-exempt bonds at any interest rate is limited. 3 6 Secondly, a large increase in the volume of
housing bonds will drive up the rates on all tax-exempt issues.'"

gross income' toward the program's $40,000 income ceiling, upper income applicants could
shelter real income or assets and still qualify." Brune & Tell, City's Low-Interest Home
Loans Bypass Minority Communities; Blacks, Latinos Buy in White Areas, Secure OneThird of Loans, 8 The Chicago Reporter 1, 3 (January 1979). The study also showed that
predominantly black and Latino communities lost out under the program. Id.
130. See City's low-interest home-loan plan spreads to suburbs, Chicago Tribune,
March 4, 1979, §N14 at 1, col. 1.
131. Chicago Tribune, Dec. 31, 1978, §1 at 6, col. 4. Chicago officials were pleased that
607 suburbanites and 70 out-of-staters used the loan subsidy to move into city neighborhoods. Nevertheless, 412 homeowners, who sold their homes to families in the mortgage
bond program, moved out of the city. The net gain for the city-205 families-was
negligible.
132. In Arkansas, where the usery rate was stuck at 10%, mortgage revenue bond programs supplied nearly the only available source of mortgage money.
133. Hearings on H.R. 3712, supra note 4, at 13.
134. A congressional study projects that by 1984 state and local governments will issue
between $20 billion and $35 billion in single-family housing bonds. This would represent 3050% of all long-term tax-exempt bonds and 10% of new mortgages. Congressional Budget
Office Study, supra note 17, at xiv.
135. Since the interest on tax-exempt bonds is generally much less than on comparable
securities, tax-exempt bonds are only attractive to high-bracket taxpayers. For example, if
the interest on a taxable bond is 10%, a 50% bracket taxpayer would be wiser to invest in
7% tax-exempt bonds because his return after taxes on the taxable security would only be
5%. The taxpayer in the 20% bracket, however, would find it more profitable to invest in
the 10% taxable bond since his after-taxes return would be 8%.
136. As more tax-exempt bonds are put on the market, issuers will be forced to offer
higher interest rates in order to attract investment by taxpayers in marginal tax brackets.
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The Urban Institute estimates that tax-exempt interest rates rise
0.04-0.07 percentage points for each additional billion dollars of
housing revenue bonds. 1 . 7 These two factors, in turn, could seriously jeopardize the ability of municipalities to market bonds on
more traditional projects such as schools, sewage and water plants,
hospitals and roads.
A constant criticism of mortgage revenue bonds, and municipal
bonds in general, is their detrimental effect on the progressive rate
structure of the tax system.'s By providing tax-free income to
high-bracket taxpayers, the burden of providing federal revenue
shifts to lower-bracket taxpayers. In addition, the programs provide substantially less assistance to potential home buyers than it
costs the federal government in lost revenue. 139 The number of underwriters, insurers, lenders and lawyers needed to administer the
program results in high administrative costs."40 In comparison to
federal direct spending programs, the administrative costs make
this form of housing subsidy inefficient.
Congress has expressed concern that the dramatic rise in mortgage revenue bonds may hamper the determination of the appropriate amount of expenditures for housing."' State and local governments are able to sidestep the federal budget and expenditure
process through this form of indirect spending. Another concern is
that an increase in mortgage bonds directs a greater percentage of
fixed investment into housing rather than other forms of investment. 4" This could decrease the productivity of the economy.
The federal government has become increasingly disturbed
about the effect mortgage revenue bonds had on its efforts to control inflation."43 The Treasury has determined that mortgage revenue bonds are inflationary in several respects." 44 First, they con-

137. George E. Peterson, Tax-Exempt Financing of Housing Investment (Washington,
D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1979). See generally Swensen, The Cyclical Behavior of the Net
Interest Cost Differential Between General ObligationBonds and Revenue Bonds, 27 Nat'l
Tax J. 123 (1974).
138. H.R. Rep. No. 96-678, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1979).
139. Id.
140. One commentator reported that, of a $28.9 million issue floated by Saline County,
Arkansas, 17% went to cover expenses and reserves (underwriters' fee 1.9%, financial advisor's fee 1%, issuing costs 1.1%, mortgage reserve 1%, capital reserve 12%). Smith, TaxFree Housing Bonds Cost More Than They Are Worth, Fortune, July 2, 1979, at 68.
141. H.R. Rep. No. 96-678, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1979).
142. Id. at 23.
143. 126 Cong. Rec. 2210 (1980).
144. Hearings on H.R. 3712, note 4 supra, at 12.
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tribute to deficit spending. Second, they drive up housing prices by
adding demand to an already bullish market. Third, they frustrate
the administration's tight monetary policy and prevent the housing
market from contributing its share in "cooling off the economy".
The rapid expansion of the mortgage revenue bond market and the
tight monetary policy of the Federal Reserve Board illustrate the
inconsistency between federal and local governmental attitudes to5
ward an inflationary housing market.
CONCLUSION

The unrestricted growth of tax-exempt housing bonds conflicts
with the federal government's anti-inflation policy and contributes
to the overall instability of the economic system. The issuance of
mortgage revenue bonds to provide additional mortgage money is
not justified when the proceeds assist upper-income borrowers to
purchase homes. This constitutes an abuse of the state's borrowing
power, as the "public purpose" standard has not been met. The
continued expansion of the mortgage bond market also threatens
the financing of traditional government projects. Excessive issues
of mortgage revenue bonds may impair a city's credit rating.
The total elimination of the tax-exempt status for mortgage revenue bonds would remove the problems associated with their use,
but only by sacrificing the benefits of such programs. The housing
industry, which is disproportionately affected by the Federal Reserve's tight monetary policy, obtains some assistance from these
bonds. In addition, with bond programs, local control replaces federal bureaucracy. Nevertheless, by taxing the interest on mortgage
bonds, the federal government could maintain the progressive tax
structure and curtail the loss of federal revenue.
Current legislative . activity indicates that the unrestricted
growth of tax-exempt bonds will not continue. 1" 6 The 96th Con145. See, e.g., Chicago Tribune, July 25, 1978, §3 at 2, col. 4L. The following comment
appeared in the "Voice of the People" Column:
"...Chicago intends to use a provision of the Internal Revenue Code to reduce
interest rates which are artificially high because of actions of the Federal Reserve
Board.
Question: Which of the following is an example of governmental lunacy?
1. The law permitting the Federal Reserve Board to raise interest rates.
2. The Internal Revenue Code which encourages such schemes as proposed by
Mayor Bilandic.
3. Both of the above."
Harry D. Leinenweber, Ill. State Rep., 42nd District.
146. See, Sen. Long Wants Curb on Tax-Exempt Issues For Housing Purposes, Wall St.
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gress has introduced no fewer than eleven bills attempting to eliminate or restrict the interest exemption on mortgage subsidy
bonds. 141 At the time of this publication, the House has passed a
bill approving the continuation of mortgage bond programs but
with severe restrictions. The underlying purpose of the Mortgage
Subsidy Bond Tax Act of 19791 is to restrict the volume of mortgage bonds while directing the available bond proceeds to those
segments of the population in greatest need of them. Legislation
such as this would eliminate the disadvantages of mortgage revenue bonds while preserving most of the benefits. A limitation on
the volume of bonds issued would protect the bond market for
other governmental issues. By selecting the criteria for eligible
beneficiaries, the legislation would ensure that bond proceeds sat-

J., May 29, 1979, at 29, col. 3; Carter to Endorse Plan Ending Tax-Exempts for Certain
Housing, Wall St. J., May 14, 1979, at 29, col. 3; House Panel to Mull Housing Bond Plan
Or Tax Credits to Help Needy Buy Homes, Wall St. J., July 18, 1979, at 15, col. 1; House
Unit Shapes Bill Limiting Tax-Exempt Mortgage Bond Issues, Wall St. J., July 20, 1979,
at 22, col. 2.
147. Cong. Index (CCH); S. 1180, S. 1726, S. 1751, S. 2064, H. 3712 H. 4030, H.4125, H.
4189, H. 4332, H. 5370, H. 5741.
148. H.R. 5741, 96th Cong., 2d Seas., 126 Cong. Rec. 2218 (1980). The proposed section
103A of the Internal Revenue Code requires that beneficiaries of mortgage revenue bond
programs have not been homeowners within the last three years and must use the proceeds
to purchase their principal residence. There are exceptions, however, for rehabilitation
loans, home improvement loans, and mortgages in target areas. In addition, the income of
the borrower must not exceed 115% of the median family income in the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) or county. If the beneficiary is to purchase housing in a
targeted area, as defined by the Act, one-third of the houses financed by the issue can be
provided to any person regardless of his income. The other third of the mortgagors cannot
exceed 140% of median family income for the state or -the SMSA. Regardless of the area
where the residences are located, 50% of the mortgage funds must go to families with incomes of 90% or less than the median family income in the SMSA.
The House bill aids the borrower by requiring that at least 75% of the proceeds be lent
for mortgages with no greater than a 5% downpayment. The purchase price of the homes
bought from the housing bond proceeds must not exceed 80% of the average purchase price
in the preceding year in the same SMSA in which the house is located. Additionally, none of
the proceeds can be used to refinance an existing mortgage. Under H.R. 5741, the volume of
mortgage revenue bonds that can be issued within a state each year cannot exceed the
greater of $50,000,000 or 5% of the average of all mortgages originated in that state in the
proceeding three years. The bill also contains a sunset provision on mortgages issued for
owner-occupied housing. After two years from the date of enactment, interest on such bonds
will become taxable.
As to multi-family housing, the Act continues the tax-exempt status of bonds where "substantially all" of the proceeds are to be used to finance rental units in which 20% are occupied by individuals of low or moderate income. In addition, H.R. 5741 provides that bonds
may be qualifiedly issued for the benefit of veterans. Miscellaneous provisions pertain to
such items as arbitrage restrictions and who can originate the mortgages.
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isfy the public purpose of assisting low- and moderate-income families in the purchase of homes.
JAN BRUNKEN

